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NOTE
THE UNRECOGNIZED RIGHT: HOW WEALTH
DISCRIMINATION UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
BARS INDIGENT CITIZENS FROM
THE JURY BOX
Kevin J. Quilty*
In state jury trials, the amount of compensation paid to jurors is
determined on a county level.  This has produced a wide disparity in
juror pay—from as high as around $50.00 per day in some states to as
low as around $2.00 per day in others.  For many people, especially non-
salaried workers, such low amounts effectively bar participation as a
juror.  The traditional way in which courts have handled such a situation
is to allow the indigent person to claim “hardship” and excuse him or
her from jury service.
This Note suggests that such an approach may be backwards.  In-
stead, this Note argues, courts should find that there is a fundamental
right to serve on a jury and hold that de minimis juror pay unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against indigent persons on the basis of wealth.
Supporting this claim are writings and practices of the Founding genera-
tion regarding the importance of jury service, Supreme Court precedent
regarding other fundamental rights—such as the right to vote—and em-
pirical evidence demonstrating that low juror pay keeps many indigent
individuals from being able to serve in the jury box.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a man—we’ll call him Mr. Vandelay.  Mr. Vandelay is an
intelligent, thoughtful, and judicious person.  But the 2008 financial
crash hit Mr. Vandelay hard, and he lost his once well-paying job.  Mr.
Vandelay now works at a restaurant making minimum wage in order to
support his family.  One day, Mr. Vandelay received a summons for jury
duty.  Mr. Vandelay views jury duty as one of the greatest aspects of the
American governmental system.  Mr. Vandelay sincerely believes that
every person should be guaranteed the right to have a diverse group of
his peers—not the government that is prosecuting him—decide his or her
fate.  Mr. Vandelay, however, is prevented from serving on the jury.  He
lives paycheck to paycheck, dollar to dollar.  His employer will not pay
him for the time he would serve on the jury, and the $2.00 per day that
the court would pay him would force his family to skip meals for the
next week.  He must claim financial hardship and be denied the opportu-
nity to serve on the jury.
On the other side of town, Dr. Van Nostrand has also received a
jury summons.  Dr. Van Nostrand feels the same way about jury duty as
Mr. Vandelay.  Dr. Van Nostrand promptly asked his secretary to put the
jury date on his calendar.  Dr. Van Nostrand’s employer will similarly
not pay for time served on a jury.  But this is no matter.  Dr. Van Nos-
trand belongs to the middle class.  Dr. Van Nostrand is selected to be on
a jury.  While serving, he votes to acquit an innocent man.
Mr. Vandelay and Dr. Van Nostrand are the same age, same gender,
same race, and have the same IQ.  Yet because of Mr. Vandelay’s indi-
gent status, he was denied the fundamental right to serve on a jury.
Perhaps I am getting ahead of myself.  Is there even a “right” to
serve on a jury?  And if so, does discriminating against the indigent class
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violate that right?  These are the questions that this Note seeks to
address.
As way of introduction, in the United States federal court system,
jurors are guaranteed $40 per day, plus costs associated with travel to
and from the court.1  State courts, however, do not conform to the federal
system, and counties in each state set their own amount of pay.2  Thus,
the amount of pay for jurors in state courts varies widely.  One scholar
found juror pay in counties across the nation to be as high as $50.00 per
day and as low as $2.00 per day.3  This Note explores whether such de
minimis juror pay may unconstitutionally exclude indigent citizens from
serving on the jury.  Admittedly, there are no laws explicitly banning
indigent persons from serving on a jury.  But with juror pay set as low as
$2.00 per day, there is no need, for such persons will self-select out.
By concentrating on founding-era practices, Supreme Court juris-
prudence, and empirical evidence, I conclude that there is a fundamental
right to serve on a jury, and that discriminating against the indigent class,
via de minimis juror pay, violates that right under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING JURIES
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The Supreme Court has not held that denying a member of the indi-
gent class the opportunity to serve on a jury violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.  However, that in no way bars
the Court from so holding in the future.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has
been notoriously sluggish in extending juror rights to minority groups.
Analyzing Supreme Court rulings in jury selection cases pertaining to
race or gender suggests that the Court could uphold an equal protection
challenge for a member of the indigent class in the future.  While tremen-
dous progress has been made in advancing the right of equal protection
for jurors in groups traditionally discriminated against, such as women4
1 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b)(1) (2012) (“A juror shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day
for actual attendance at the place of trial or hearing.  A juror shall also be paid the attendance
fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from such place at the begin-
ning and end of such service or at any time during such service.”).
2 See Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate
Jurors Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 298 (2002).
3 For example, the average jury compensation is $50.00 per day in South Dakota, while
states that compensate jurors according to county-based fees may be as low as $2.00 per day in
some South Carolina communities. See id. at 339. See also Jury Management State Links,
NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Jury/Jury-Management/State-Links
.aspx?cat=Juror%20Pay (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (finding that Nevada does not pay a juror
for the first two days of jury service).
4 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (holding that a jury system
that forced women to “opt in” to jury service selection was unconstitutional).
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and African-Americans,5 that progress took years of slow, stilted devel-
opments.  A brief recap of jury service jurisprudence in the realm of race
and gender will help to illuminate the argument regarding indigent per-
sons and equal protection.
A. Race, Gender, and Jury Selection in the Supreme Court
Beginning before the founding of the country and lasting until at
least the Civil War, jury service in the United States was reserved over-
whelmingly for white males.  Both women6 and African-Americans7
were specifically prohibited.  After the Civil War, organic transforma-
tions in the states began to allow for both women and blacks to serve on
juries.8  This was, however, still the exception rather than the rule.9
Meaningful change began with the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875,10 which made it a criminal offense to disqualify African-Ameri-
cans from jury service on account of their race.11  It was this statute that
also provided the first Supreme Court intervention into jury selection.
Five years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Su-
preme Court decided a “trilogy”12 of cases that “confirmed the validity
of the [1875] statute, as well as the broader constitutional imperative of
race neutrality in jury selection.”13  During the post-war Reconstruction
effort, African-Americans in the South served in large numbers on juries,
especially in communities with large black populations.14
5 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986) (holding that racially moti-
vated peremptory challenges were unconstitutional).
6 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 931, 934 (2011) (quoting Blackstone’s pronouncement that women had propter
defectum sexus, a “defect of sex,” which rendered them ineligible for jury service).
7 See id. at 934–35 (explaining that in the antebellum period, African-Americans were
“excluded from jury service in all southern and most northern states”).
8 See id. at 935–36 (noting the first and increasing opportunities after the Civil War for
women and African Americans to serve on juries).
9 See id. at 936–37 (noting that women were still subject to the systematic exclusion
from juries, while the ensuing disfranchisement of African Americans in the South facilitated
the exclusion of blacks from juries).
10 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by United States v. Stanley
(The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11 Id. (“That no citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed
by law shall be disqualified for service as a grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . . . .”),
quoted in Chhablani, supra note 6, at 936 n.18. R
12 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (labeling the “trilogy” as Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); and Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)).
13 Id.
14 Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 371.
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But as Reconstruction came to an end, the number of African-
Americans serving on juries dwindled almost to a vanishing point.15  Al-
though the Supreme Court had struck a victory for equality in the jury
box with its trilogy of cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the
effect of these rulings was severely watered down by later Supreme
Court holdings.  Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently imposed “strin-
gent standards of proof on defendants alleging race discrimination in jury
selection and announc[ed] a broad rule of deference to state court find-
ings on the question of discrimination.”16
Women were likewise excluded from general jury service for most
of the nation’s history.17  However, prior to 1921, some women were
allowed to serve on special juries regarding “cases involving pregnancy
or children’s welfare.”18  Although women did gain some traction in the
opportunity to participate in jury service after the passage and ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment, most states still excluded women from
serving on the jury.19  As late as the 1960s, the Supreme Court was still
hesitant to give full equal protection to women.  Exemplary is the 1961
decision in Hoyt v. Florida.20  In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a
Florida statute that excluded women from jury service unless they proac-
tively registered with the clerk of the court and voiced their desire to be
placed on the jury list.21
B. The Modern Era of the Supreme Court’s Race and Gender
Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court began its modern approach to jury composition
in the 1940s.  The truly “landmark case in the advancement of the fair
cross-section requirement”22 was Smith v. Texas.23  There, the Supreme
Court held that Texas’s jury scheme, while facially neutral, was being
carried out in a way that systematically excluded African-Americans
from jury service.24  The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection, the Court stated, must actually be put into action, not merely
15 See id. (“[B]lacks became noticeably less present on southern juries by the late 1880s
and generally disappeared in the 1890s.  Through the first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, essentially no blacks sat on southern juries.”).
16 Id. at 304.
17 See Chhablani, supra note 6, at 937. R
18 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 73 (2007).
19 See id.
20 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
21 See id. at 58.
22 See Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Prom-
ise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 335 (2005).
23 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
24 See id. at 130–31.
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promised.25  Two years later, the Supreme Court in Glasser v. United
States26 reaffirmed Smith v. Texas and made explicit its view that a
proper “cross-section of the community” was required for selecting pro-
spective jurors so that a jury is a true representation of society.27
The Supreme Court continued this line of rulings into the late 20th
century.  The Court again extolled the virtues of a “cross section” of the
community in the 1975 case, Taylor v. Louisiana.28  In Taylor, the Court
explicitly overturned its holding in Hoyt and ruled that the systematic
exclusion of women from jury selection via an “opt-in” process was un-
constitutional.29  Eleven years after Taylor, the Court made another
strong statement in Batson v. Kentucky.30  The Court in Batson held that
the Equal Protection Clause shielded prospective members of a jury from
being stricken via peremptory challenge on account of their race.31
Yet even Batson, an opinion written over one hundred years after
the 1880 trilogy, is still widely criticized as not going far enough to end
discrimination in the jury box.32  Thus, although the Supreme Court has
shown an ability to evolve on the issue of equality in the jury box, it
moves at a glacial pace.  The Court has taken the tentative first steps in
recognizing and protecting indigent citizens’ right to serve on the jury.33
But it has not yet afforded indigent citizens the same constitutional pro-
tections that it has for African-Americans and women.  Before that can
be done, however, it must be demonstrated that indigent citizens have
actually been prevented from serving on juries because of de minimis
juror pay.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Juror pay in some counties is prohibitively low for indigent citizens.
As mentioned above, the federal government has mandated minimum
payment of $40.00 per day for jurors.34  This, however, has not been
25 See id. at 130 (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that equal protection to all must
be given—not merely promised.”).
26 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
27 See id. at 86 (stating that the proper functioning of the jury system requires the jury
body to truly represent the community and that officials charged with choosing jurors should
make selections that comport with the concept of the jury as being a cross-section of the
community).
28 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29 Id. at 537 (“[W]e think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be
excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex . . . .  To this extent we cannot
follow the contrary implications of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida.”).
30 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31 Id. at 89.
32 Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1588–91 (2012) (enumer-
ating the ways Batson has been ineffective).
33 See infra Part IV.
34 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b)(1) (2009).
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applied to the states.  While some states have statutorily mandated em-
ployer compensation for jury duty, even those statutes have serious limi-
tations.35  Some states, for example, only cover full-time, salaried
employees.36  Other states qualify their reimbursement scheme with fac-
tors such as requiring that the individual who was called for jury duty to
have young children.37  Furthermore, courts have dealt with financial is-
sues preventing people from serving on a jury in a backwards manner.
Instead of raising the pay for jurors, they have excused jurors who cannot
participate because of “financial hardship.”38
Would increased juror pay lead to higher juror participation, and
thus a more representative cross-section of society in the jury box?  An-
ecdotally, this certainly seems to be the case.39  The empirical evidence
also suggests it would.  For example, in 1993, Arizona began a major
review of jury service in the state.  Arizona assigned a committee the
task of leading the review and reporting its findings.40  To gather evi-
dence, the committee established over fifteen subcommittees, each of
which examined particular issues pertaining to jury service and then re-
ported back to the full committee.41  The juror pay in 1993 in Arizona
was $12 per day, plus travel mileage reimbursement.42  The committee
stated in its report that it believed such a low per diem discouraged po-
tential jurors from serving for financial reasons.43  Specifically, the re-
port concluded: “At present, juror pay is so low as to be unfair.  It is
especially unfair to jurors who have no or only modest incomes.  Low
juror pay also contributes to jury underrepresentativeness by discourag-
ing low income persons from serving.”44  After studying other states with
a higher per diem, the committee urged that jury pay be increased to $50
per day.45  To offset the costs to the state, the committee recommended
35 See generally Alexander E. Preller, Jury Duty is a Poll Tax: The Case for Severing the
Link Between Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2012).
36 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:43-b (2010) (protecting only salaried employ-
ees, not all employees), cited in Preller, supra note 35, at 12. R
37 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.106(a)(2) (West 2013) (covering only parents
with children age twelve and under), cited in Preller, supra note 35, at 12. R
38 See, e.g., United States v. Edouard, 200 F. App’x 970, 971 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A juror
can be excused from jury duty because of severe financial hardship.”).
39 See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Why Does Everyone Hate Jury Duty? Ctd, THE DISH (Feb.
29, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/02/29/why-does-everyone-hate-
jury-duty-ctd-2/ (publishing complaints, among other things, about low juror pay).
40 See B. Michael Dunn & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79
JUDICATURE 280 (1996).
41 See ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM., JURORS: THE POWER OF 12—REPORT OF THE ARI-
ZONA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MORE EFFICIENT USE OF JURIES (1994) [hereinafter
THE POWER OF 12].
42 Dunn & Logan III, supra note 40, at 283. R
43 Id.
44 See THE POWER OF 12, supra note 41, at 56. R
45 Dunn & Logan III, supra note 40, at 284. R
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two steps: first, that employers pay the first three days; and second, that
the state eliminate the mile reimbursement for jurors who travel less than
fifty miles round trip.46  The committee came to the conclusion that such
a scheme was feasible after studying empirical data on juror length of
service in Arizona counties.47  The business community, however, appar-
ently had no interest in paying its employees while they were on jury
duty and thus effectively halted this proposal in the legislature.48
Further empirical evidence buttresses the Arizona study’s conclu-
sions in different areas of juror pay.  Employer reimbursement, for exam-
ple, as it is currently constituted does not make up for the low amount of
money that the court system pays.  A study by Robert Boatright49
showed that employer compensation can actually further the economic
skew in the jury box.  In Boatright’s study, potential jurors were ques-
tioned about employer reimbursement.  The responses showed that,
based on employee belief, employer reimbursement actually increases as
incomes rise.50  A majority (72%) of those at the higher end of the in-
come spectrum ($80,000 or above) believed that they would be reim-
bursed by their employers; however, fewer than half (47%) of those
making less than $20,000 believed that their employers would reimburse
them.51  Empirical research has confirmed these beliefs.52  Those who
earn more income are more likely to be reimbursed by their employers
for time spent in the jury box.53  Thus, indigent individuals, who have a
greater need to be reimbursed, are disincentivized from serving on the
jury because of the low juror pay, while those with high incomes do not
feel this effect.  This, of course, leads to juries that are skewed towards
wealthy individuals, throwing off the “cross section” requirement that the
Supreme Court has insisted upon.
Furthermore, a study done by Professor Fukurai54 underscores the
immense importance of social status when determining who serves on a
jury.  Fukurai examined the effects of race and social class in jury selec-
tion.  Social class, for Fukurai, was composed of “work related authority,
46 Id.
47 See THE POWER OF 12, supra note 41, at 57. R
48 See Dunn & Logan III, supra note 40, at 284 (citing the case of Arizona where the jury R
fee proposal was firmly rebuffed by the business community and the court was forced to
withhold its legislative proposal).
49 Robert G. Boatright, Why Citizens Don’t Respond to Jury Summonses and What
Courts Can Do About It, 82 JUDICATURE 156 (1999).
50 See id. at 163 tbl.6.
51 See id.
52 See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INCREASING THE
JURY POOL: IMPACT OF THE EMPLOYER TAX CREDIT 5–6 (2004).
53 Id.
54 Hiroshi Fukurai, Race, Social Class, and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for
Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and Jury Selection, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 77 (1996).
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occupational standing, annual income, and perhaps ownership status.”55
The data Fukurai collected led him to believe that a potential juror’s so-
cial class is more important than racial or ethnic backgrounds in deter-
mining jury participation.56  Fukurai found that being a part of a low
social class is a major impediment to serving on a jury.57  Indeed, he
asserted that “[b]lue-collar workers in insecure job positions also may
face job loss if called for jury service.”58  Although many states have
provisions in their codes that prohibit firing employees for reporting for
jury duty, some employees and supervisors are unaware of this.59  Thus,
despite these provisions, some workers may still be concerned—and
rightly so—about their employment security.60  Even if job loss does not
occur, Fukurai nevertheless contends that prospective jurors making min-
imum wage “cannot afford a sudden and involuntary pay cut.”61  Thus, a
class of individuals, based on its lower social status, faces perhaps the
greatest roadblocks to serving on a jury.
One study from Washington, on the surface, may appear to cut
against this trend.  A 2008 report to the Washington State Legislature
chronicled the results of a study that argued that higher juror pay would
not increase juror participation.62  The report cited research from across
the country which found that residents of low-income neighborhoods
were less likely to appear for jury duty than residents of white middle-
class neighborhoods.63  The purpose of the study was to determine
whether raising juror pay (which was set at $10 in Washington State at
the time of the study) would increase citizen participation.64  For pur-
poses of the study, juror pay was raised to $60 dollars in three Washing-
ton counties.65  One of the study’s conclusions was that “[t]here [wa]s no
evidence that increased pay increase[d] juror representativeness.”66  In
one county after the pay increase, participation increased moderately; in
55 Id. at 83.
56 Id. at 85.
57 Id. at 82.
58 Id. at 83.
59 Susan Carol Losh et al., “Reluctant Jurors”: What Summons Responses Reveal About
Jury Duty Attitudes, 83 JUDICATURE 304, 309 (2000).
60 Id. (finding that when a notice was attached to a jury summons informing employers
that it was illegal to fire employees for attending jury service, request for an excuse citing “job
security” fell to near zero).
61 Fukurai, supra note 54, at 83. R
62 WASH. STATE CTR. FOR COURT RESEARCH, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUROR
RESEARCH PROJECT—REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE (2008).
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 13.
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another county, the rate remained constant; and in the third, juror partici-
pation actually declined.67
However, as the report itself acknowledges, there were multiple
limitations on this study.  Foremost among the limitations were time and
publicity.  The study was run for a year.  A year, however, was appar-
ently not enough time to spread the word that juror pay had been raised.
Indeed, a post-study survey showed that only 8% of those who received
summonses but did not participate in juror selection had been aware that
the juror pay had increased.68  Eight percent of the survey population is,
of course, a small sample size from which to draw a conclusion on
whether a pay increase for potential jurors would increase juror participa-
tion.  Finally, the study acknowledged that two studies outside Washing-
ton State showed an increase in juror participation rates after the jury pay
was increased,69 leaving Washington State’s study as the outlier.70
The empirical evidence thus suggests that indigent citizens are pre-
cluded from serving on juries because of financial restraints.  The result
of this research is unsurprising.  Indeed, in the better-studied realm of
race and jury service, scholars have floated the idea that increasing juror
pay could increase the number of minorities reporting for jury service.71
The second issue that needs to be addressed, then, is whether there is a
fundamental right for all people—regardless of wealth status—to have
the opportunity to serve on a jury.
III. THE RIGHT TO SERVE ON A JURY
The “right to serve on a jury” must be viewed on equal ground with
the “right to vote.”  Both the views and practices of the Founders as well
as Supreme Court precedent support such an argument.  The Founders
placed a tremendous amount of importance on a representative democ-
racy facilitated by citizen voting.  But the Founders also understood jury
service as among the most important features of majoritarian self-gov-
ernance.72  Similar to voting, the Founders viewed the role of the jury as
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 5.
70 The Washington study neglects to cite the two studies that show increased response
rates following an increase in jury pay.  Nevertheless, Walters & Curriden cite to El Paso,
Texas, and New York State as evidence of an increase in juror pay leading to an increase in
juror participation. See Robert Walters & Mark Curriden, A Jury of One’s Peers? Investigat-
ing Underrepresentation in Jury Venires, 43 JUDGES’ J., Fall 2004, at 20 (citing a juror partici-
pation jump from 22% to 46% in two years, and 12% to 39% in three years in El Paso, Texas
and New York State, respectively, after an increase in juror pay to $40 per day).
71 Valerie P. Hans, Jury Representativeness: It’s No Joke in the State of New York, COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 20, 2012), http://jlpp.org/blogzine/?p=652.
72 Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 COR-
NELL L. REV. 203, 218 (1995).
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a crucial bulwark to unopposed governmental power.73  Indeed, jury ser-
vice, when brought to its final act, is voting.  The jurors retire after hear-
ing all evidence and arguments presented and vote on a particular
outcome.
A host of statements and practices surrounding the Founding era,
and shortly afterwards, emphasize the importance of universal jury ser-
vice.  The influential “federal farmer” wrote: “It is essential in every free
country, that common people should have a part and share of influence,
in the judicial as well as in the legislative department.”74  Accordingly,
the first Congress actually set a jury pay rate at fifty cents per day.75
This was the average amount of money a laborer would make in a day in
1789.76  An early commentator on the American government, Alexis de
Tocqueville, commented extensively on the American jury.  And indeed,
he directly linked voting and jury service, stating: “‘Every American citi-
zen can vote or be voted for and may be a juror.’”77
This importance of an individual to be able to serve on a jury with-
out regard to financial situation has extended to the modern era.  Indeed,
the United States federal government has gone so far as to codify one’s
right to serve on a jury regardless of economic class.  Section 1862 of the
United States Code reads: “No citizen shall be excluded from service as a
grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States . . . on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status.”78
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has on multiple occasions equated
the right to serve on a jury with the right to vote.  For example, the Court
in Bush v. Vera79 called jury service and voting the two “basic forms of
political participation.”80  The Court in Powers v. Ohio called voting and
jury service the two “most significant opportunit[ies] to participate in the
democratic process.”81  It singled out jury service as a “duty, honor, and
privilege.”82  And writing in dissent in Powers, Justice Scalia termed
73 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183
(1991) (“[T]he key role of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental
overreaching. . . .  [T]he jury could thwart overreaching by powerful and ambitious govern-
ment officials.”).
74 Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
249–50 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981), cited in Amar, supra, note 72, at 220 (emphasis added). R
75 See Seamone, supra note 2, at 343 (citing the Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. R
216, 217).
76 See id. at 352–53.
77 See Amer, supra note 72, at 221 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN R
AMERICA APP. I at 702 (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966)).
78 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012) (emphasis added).
79 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
80 Id. at 968–69.
81 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
82 Id. at 415.
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jury service a “civic right.”83  The Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co.84 stated that jury service was a “duty as well as a privilege.”85  In-
deed, modern commentators have explicitly read the Court’s statements
as establishing the “rights of individuals to serve as jurors.”86
Thus, the Founders’ statements and actions as well as Supreme
Court jurisprudence demonstrate that to serve on a jury is a fundamental
civic right.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND ECONOMIC STATUS
OF POTENTIAL JURORS
Although the struggles of African-Americans and women have been
on the forefront of obtaining the right to serve on a jury, the Court has
broadened its scope enough at times to suggest that other groups should
similarly not be denied the right to serve on a jury.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has directly examined economic status
in relation to jury service.  In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., a passenger,
Thiel, jumped out of the window of a moving train run by Southern Pa-
cific Company.87  Thiel then sued Southern Pacific, alleging that the
company knew he was “out of his normal mind” and should have either
rejected him as a passenger or else kept him under guard.88  After the
jury was selected, Thiel made a motion to strike the jury as paneled.  He
claimed that the jurors selected were “mostly business executives” that
“g[ave] a majority representation to one class” and “discriminat[ed]
against other occupations and classes, particularly the employees and
those in the poorer classes.”89  The district denied Thiel’s claim, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.90
In reversing the lower courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court stated
in strong terms the need for all economic classes to be represented on the
jury and warned of the “evil” in the exclusion of a whole class of peo-
ple.91  The Court stated that juror competency is a decision to be made
on an individual, rather than a class, basis.  If competency were decided
on a class basis, the Court stated, it would “open the door to class distinc-
tions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of
83 Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“All qualified citizens have a civic right, of course,
to serve as jurors . . . .”).
84 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
85 Id. at 224 (“Jury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship . . . .”).
86 JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PRO-
MOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 5 (2010).
87 Thiel, 328 U.S. at 218–19.
88 Id. at 219.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 219–20.
91 Id. at 220–25.
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trial by jury.”92  Specifically in Thiel, the clerk of the court and the jury
commissioner testified that they “deliberately and intentionally” ex-
cluded any potential jurors who worked for a daily wage.93  The Court
rebuked such an action.  “[A potential juror] who is paid $3 a day may be
as fully competent as one who is paid $30 a week or $300 a month.”94
The Court went on to say that that daily wage earners made up a substan-
tial portion of the community, and they could not be “intentionally and
systematically” excluded.95
While this case may seem to squarely support the notion that the
Court is directly prohibiting actions that have the effect of excluding in-
digent jurors, the Court stopped short of providing a specific constitu-
tional rationale that lower courts could follow and expand upon.
Additionally, the Court stated that a judge could excuse a daily wage
earner that would endure undue “financial hardship” by serving on the
jury.96  Financial hardship was defined in Thiel, and lower courts have
carried its standard into the 21st century.97  The Court in Thiel held that
“[o]nly when the financial embarrassment is such as to impose a real
burden and hardship does a valid excuse of this nature appear.”98  This
reading has given state courts an excuse to dismiss indigent workers
from jury duty instead of adequately paying them.
Thus, unlike the tectonic movements in the rights for women and
African-Americans to serve on the jury, there has not been an equal push
to continue expanding Thiel.  Supreme Court rulings have reflected this.
Only twenty-four Supreme Court cases have cited Thiel since it was de-
cided in 1946.99  And in the majority of those cases, Thiel is referenced
in situations dealing with race or gender.  Indeed, only two cases use
Thiel in the context of economic discrimination.100  And even then, the
citations are relegated to a footnote and a dissent.
92 Id. at 220.
93 Id. at 221.
94 Id. at 223.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 224.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Edouard, 200 F. App’x 970, 971 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A juror
can be excused from jury duty because of severe financial hardship.” (citing Thiel, 328 U.S. at
224)).
98 Thiel, 328 U.S. at 224.
99 Although, as one would expect, federal appellate courts and state courts have cited to
Thiel more than the Supreme Court has (125 times and 294 times, respectively), these numbers
are still relatively low.  For example, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), written
four years before Thiel, has been cited by federal appellate courts 6,018 times and by state
courts 1,497 times.
100 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497
(1948).
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In Castaneda v. Partida,101 for example, the case centered on
whether Mexican-Americans were discriminated against during jury se-
lection.  The Supreme Court acknowledged the lower court’s suspicion
that the real discrimination at work might have been economic, not racial
in nature.102  Because the respondent did not advance an economic dis-
crimination argument, however, the Supreme Court punted the question
of whether clandestine economic discrimination was sufficient to make a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination.103
In Frazier v. United States,104 the petitioner, Frazier, was indicted
for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act, a federal statute.105  Frazier’s
jury was made up entirely of federal government employees.106  Frazier
advanced a Sixth Amendment challenge as to the jury composition.  The
majority ruled that because the jury pool was made up of both private
and public employees (nine private employees and thirteen public em-
ployees) and the petitioner struck all nine of the private employees with
his not-for-cause peremptory strikes, there was no Sixth Amendment vio-
lation.  Justice Jackson and three other Justices dissented, however, and
would have held that the low per diem provided by the court violated the
Constitution.  They stated:
The nongovernment juror receives $4 per day, which
under present conditions is inadequate to be compensa-
tory to nearly every gainfully employed juror.  But the
government employee is not paid specially; instead, he is
given leave from his government work with full pay
while serving on the jury.  The latter class are thus in-
duced to jury service by protection against any financial
loss, while the former are subjected to considerable
disadvantage.
This condition makes it obvious that, if jury service
is put on virtually a voluntary basis and qualified per-
sons are allowed to decline jury service at their own op-
tion, the panel will become loaded with government
employees.  If this undue concentration of such jurors
were accomplished by any device which excluded
nongovernment jurors, it unquestionably would be con-
demned not only by reason of but even without resort to
101 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
102 Id. at 492 n.11.
103 Id. (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether a showing of simple economic discrim-
ination would be enough to make out a prima facie case in the absence of other evidence, since
that case is not before us.”).
104 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
105 Id. at 498.
106 Id.
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the doctrine that prevailed in [Ballard, Thiel, and
Glasser].107
From this language, it appears that the Court in 1948 was one vote
shy of declaring a low per diem as unconstitutionally disadvantaging an
entire class.  The language appears to use an equal protection rationale,
but again stops short of any direct citation to the Constitution.  Given that
the Supreme Court, even when taking economic discrimination cases,
has not yet suggested a constitutional line of attack for wealth discrimi-
nation cases in the jury, it is appropriate to review other avenues of
attack.
V. ATTACKS ON THE LACK OF PAY FOR A JUROR
As noted above, when the Supreme Court examined economic dis-
crimination in the jury box, it was sympathetic to the citizens who were
left off the jury because of such discrimination.  But it did not take the
necessary next step in naming the particular constitutional guarantee
which protects the indigent class’s right to serve on a jury.  Commenta-
tors have explored other avenues for securing higher juror pay under stat-
utory or constitutional grounds.  In particular, Evan Seamone has
scrutinized and dismissed the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Fifth
Amendment, and the Thirteenth Amendment, among other grounds, as
avenues of increasing juror pay.108
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a federal statute that de-
fines minimum wage and overtime rates in employee/employer relation-
ships.109  Seamone has noted that in many respects, this seems like an
ideal way to ensure adequate wages for jurors.110  The argument that
jurors are employees under the FLSA’s ambit, however, has failed in the
courts.  For example, in an 11th Circuit case, Brouwer v. Metropolitan
Dade County,111 the plaintiff, Brouwer, brought a lawsuit against Dade
County, claiming that under the FLSA’s standards, she was entitled to
minimum wage while serving on the jury.112  Brouwer argued that the
FLSA definition of employee was broad enough to include jurors.113
107 Id. at 516–17 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
108 See generally Seamone, supra note 2, at 301–08 (discussing extensively the attacks on R
de minimis juror pay stemming from the FLSA, the Fifth Amendment, and the Thirteenth
Amendment).
109 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2012).
110 Seamone, supra note 2, at 307. R
111 139 F.3d 817 (11th Cir. 1998), cited in Seamone, supra note 2, at 306–08. R
112 Id. at 818.
113 Id. at 818–19.
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The circuit court, however, held that jurors have a completely different
relationship with the county than do employees with their employers.114
In its opinion, the court enumerated a laundry list of differences in the
two relationships and rejected her argument.115
B. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, reads, “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”116  The Su-
preme Court has expanded “private property” to include the monetary
value of someone’s time.117  Thus, one could advance the argument that
the time a juror spends only being paid de minimis compensation
amounts to a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.  However, such a
challenge would probably fail.118  There is Supreme Court precedent
stating that the government does not need to pay for “public duties.”  For
example, in Hurtado v. United States,119 the Petitioner, Hurtado, was a
Mexican citizen who had been illegally smuggled across the border and
into the United States.120  Hurtado was jailed in order to ensure that he
was available to serve as a witness against the smugglers.121  While
awaiting the trial, Hurtado was compensated $1 per day.122  Hurtado ar-
gued that by incarcerating him, the government had “taken” his property,
and that $1 per day was insufficient just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.123
The Supreme Court rejected this argument.124  Although its holding
was limited to incarcerated witnesses, the language that was used could
114 Id. at 819 (“Jurors are completely different from state [or county] employees.  Jurors
do not apply for employment, but are randomly selected from voter registration lists.  Jurors
are not interviewed to determine who is better qualified for a position; the State summons all
available persons who meet the basic requirements . . . .  Jurors do not voluntarily tender their
labor to the state, but are compelled to serve.  Jurors are not paid a salary, rather they receive a
statutorily mandated sum regardless of the number of hours worked.  Jurors are not eligible for
employment benefits, do not accrue vacation time, annual or sick leave and do not qualify for
health or life insurance.  The state does not have the power to fire jurors for poor performance,
but must accept their verdict.  In short, there is no indicia of an employment relationship
between state court jurors and Dade County.”).
115 Id.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117 See Seamone, supra note 2, at 302 (citing Daniel E. Witte, Comment, Getting a Grip R
on National Service: Key Organizational Features and Strategic Characteristics of the Na-
tional Service Corps (AmeriCorps), 1998 BYU L. Rev. 741, 786).
118 See Seamone, supra note 2, at 303 (“Prior court decisions at least appear to indicate R
that the hardships jurors face do not rise to the level of a prohibited taking.”).
119 410 U.S. 578 (1973), noted in Seamone, supra note 2, at 304. R
120 Id. at 579.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 581.
123 Id. at 588.
124 Id. at 588–89.
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easily be extended to jurors.  The Fifth Amendment, the Court held,
“does not require that the Government pay for the performance of a pub-
lic duty it is already owed.”125  If there is to be payment, it is controlled
by statute.126  Even if that price is low, “personal sacrifice” is part of the
obligation of the individual to the public welfare.127  Thus, under
Hurtado, a court could easily find that jury service is a “public duty,”
and that government is only required to pay what is demanded by the
statute.128
C. The Thirteenth Amendment
Finally, Seamone cites commentators who have argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment may be applicable to jurors.129  The Thirteenth
Amendment, in relevant part, proscribes involuntary servitude.130  Thus,
one could advance the argument that forcing jurors to serve for only de
minimis pay subjects them to involuntary servitude.  However, a brief
review of Supreme Court jurisprudence discounts the merits of this argu-
ment.131  Stretching back to 1916, the Supreme Court held in Butler v.
Perry132 that a Florida law requiring adult males to spend six days out of
the year working on public roads was not a Thirteenth Amendment viola-
tion.133  In its holding, the Court called working on public roads a duty
“which individuals owe to the State, such as services in the army, militia,
on the jury, etc.”134  Thus, there is direct language (albeit in dicta) sug-
gesting that serving on the jury is a duty that individuals owe to the state.
Furthermore, the Court later clarified in United States v. Kozminski135
that the primary purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment was to abolish
African slavery, and that “involuntary servitude” meant compulsory la-
bor “akin to African slavery.”136  Although it may be inconvenient for
some to serve on a jury, a few days on the jury does not begin to ap-
125 Id. at 588.
126 See id. at 590.
127 Id. at 589.
128 See Seamone, supra note 2, at 304. R
129 See Dominick T. Armentano, Use Market to Select Jurors, PRESS J., Nov. 11, 1999,
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/use-market-select-jurors (“Indeed,
forcing individuals to appear for jury duty against their will flies in the face of the spirit of
other constitutional guarantees, such as the prohibition on involuntary servitude.”), cited in
Seamone, supra note 2, at 305. R
130 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
131 See Seamone, supra note 2, at 305 (mentioning Kozminski v. United States, 487 U.S. R
931 (1988), and earlier opinions that support it).
132 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
133 Id. at 333.
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 487 U.S. 931 (1988), cited in Seamone, supra note 2, at 305. R
136 Id. at 942.
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proach the loss of personal autonomy similar to that imposed on slaves in
the American South.
Nevertheless, at least one individual has tried to make the argument
in federal court that compulsory jury service violates the Thirteenth
Amendment.  The plaintiff in Neil v. Weinstein137 argued that because he
was self-employed as a software developer, any time he was forced to
spend on jury duty would prevent him from earning a living.138  The
district court quickly dismissed Neil’s lawsuit, citing the Kozminski
Court’s reasoning that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to prevent
African slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment did not prohibit all types
of labor that a citizen may be compelled to perform for the benefit of
society.139
Thus, three seemingly viable avenues of attack—that a juror is an
“employee” under the broad FLSA definition, that paying a juror a de
minimis amount to serve on a jury amounts to a Fifth Amendment taking
without just compensation, and that forcing an individual to serve on a
jury without adequate pay is akin to involuntary servitude—each have
fatal weaknesses.  If there is a constitutional argument to be made for the
protection of a citizen’s right to serve on a jury, regardless of his or her
economic status, it must be made elsewhere.
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION
An avenue that has not been thoroughly explored, however, is that
de minimis juror pay discriminates on the basis of wealth, and thus vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.  At first
blush, however, it may seem that the equal protection guarantee is poor
grounds to mount such an attack.
A. The Supreme Court and Wealth Discrimination
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply any
form of heightened scrutiny to wealth discrimination cases.140  For exam-
ple, in Dandridge v. Williams,141 the Court upheld a law that capped
welfare benefits for families upon reaching a certain number of depen-
dents.142  Because the statute was in the “area of economics and social
137 See Neil v. Weinstein, No. 01-CV-2333, 2001 WL 34036322 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2001).
138 Id. at *1.
139 Id. at *3–4.
140 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.7.3,
at 785–86 (3d ed. 2006).
141 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
142 Id. at 472–73, 487.
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welfare,” the Court stated that it needed to only scrutinize the legislation
for some “reasonable basis.”143
The Supreme Court extended this line of reasoning in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.144  There, Mexican-American
parents brought a lawsuit on behalf of school children across the state,
“attacking the Texas system of financing public education.”145  The sys-
tem, the plaintiffs argued, resulted in a taxing and funding scheme that
discriminated against indigents.146  The majority refused to admit that the
system even targeted indigent persons as a class, but said that such an
alleged “class” would not have the “traditional indicia of suspectness,”147
and thus only merited rational basis review.  From such statements, it
would seem that wealth discrimination is not a practicable avenue to pur-
sue an equal protection claim.
B. Harper and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Guarantee
There may, however, be an exception to the state-friendly rational-
basis test the Court has employed in cases such as Dandridge and Rodri-
guez.  As discussed earlier, jury duty should be viewed as a fundamental
political right on par with voting.148  If there is Supreme Court precedent
stating that laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth in the realm of
the right to vote are unconstitutional under the equal protection guaran-
tee, then the same outcome should result for laws that discriminate on the
basis of wealth in the realm of jury service.  Enter Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections.149
In Harper, the Supreme Court consolidated three lawsuits by Vir-
ginia residents arguing that Virginia’s poll tax was unconstitutional.150  It
is important first to note which provisions of the Constitution the plain-
tiffs did not sue under.  They did not sue under the Twenty-fourth
Amendment, which forbids poll taxes only in federal elections.151  Simi-
larly—and more importantly—they did not sue under the Fifteenth
143 Id. at 485.
144 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973).
145 Id. at 4–5.
146 Id. at 11–17.
147 Id. at 28 (listing as the traditional indicia of suspectness, “the class is . . . saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process”).
148 See discussion supra Part III.
149 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
150 Id. at 664–65.
151 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.  The language of the Twenty-fourth Amendment pertains
specifically to federal elections, for example, for the president of the United States, and thus
could not be incorporated against the states as other amendments have been.
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Amendment, which prohibits denying any citizens the right to vote based
on, among other things, race.152  The Court decided Harper on the basis
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.153  The
violation at issue in Harper was clearly one of wealth discrimination.
The Court unequivocally held that to vote was “a fundamental political
right,”154 and thus a state could not, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
discriminate on the basis of wealth in this context.155
In Part III, I argued that voting and jury service should be viewed in
the same constitutional vein.  Assuming that to be the case, by the
Court’s logic in Harper, states should not be able to discriminate on the
basis of wealth against those who are allowed to enjoy the fundamental
right to serve on a jury.  Indeed, replacing “voting”-related terms in the
Harper opinion with “jury service” related terms demonstrates the natu-
ral parallelism: “[Juror] qualifications have no relation to wealth . . . .”156
“The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state [judicial] representation for all citizens . . . .  We say the same
whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to [serve as a juror], has $1.50 in
his pocket or nothing at all . . . .”157  “Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is
not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the [judicial]
process.”158  “To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a
voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.
The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”159  Finally, the Court
concluded by stating, “For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our
view, no relation to [juror] qualifications; the right to [serve on a jury] is
too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”160
I am not alone in substituting the Supreme Court’s language regard-
ing voting for language pertaining to jury service.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself has done it.  In Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp.,161
an employee sued his employer for money lost while serving on a jury
under an Alabama statute that guaranteed employees the “usual compen-
sation” while serving on a jury.162  In a brief, per curiam opinion, the
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
153 Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
154 Id. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
155 Id. at 670.
156 Id. at 666.
157 Id. at 667–68.  Also note here the similar phrasing and logic of the opinion in Thiel.
See Thiel, 328 U.S. 217, 223 (1946) (“[A potential juror] who is paid $ 3 a day may be as fully
competent as one who is paid $30 a week or $300 a month.”).
158 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
159 Id. (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 670.
161 412 U.S. 543 (1973).
162 Id. at 543.
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Court upheld the statute.  In lieu of independent reasoning specific to
jury service, the Court simply cited to another case, Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri,163 where the Court had upheld a state statute that made
it a misdemeanor for an employer to deduct the wages of an employee
when he left his job to vote.164  The opinion in Dean, quoting in long-
form from Day-Bright Lighting, called the money expended to reimburse
those leaving to serve on a jury as “‘part of the costs of our civiliza-
tion.’”165  After concluding its long-form quote, the Court concluded by
simply stating: “The Alabama statute stands on no less sturdy a foot-
ing.”166  The Court had decided there was no substantive difference be-
tween the importance of the right to vote and the importance of the right
to serve on a jury.
C. Wealth Discrimination and Fundamental Rights
Harper takes the crucial step that Thiel stumbled on.  It applied a
constitutional basis—the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantee—to wealth discrimination.  It should be noted that the Su-
preme Court in Harper used broad language when reaching its decision.
The Court did not just focus on the poll tax, but how the state used
wealth in general as a barrier to exercising a fundamental right.  Indeed,
the Court stated, “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to
one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”167
Harper is still good law despite the Court’s subsequent holdings which
analyzed wealth discrimination with a lower form of scrutiny.  This
makes sense.  Although the Court did not explicitly distinguish Harper
from cases like Dandridge or Rodriguez, it easily could have.  In Harper,
the equal protection claim deserved more than rational basis review be-
cause it dealt with a fundamental right.  However, in the cases cited
above, Dandridge and Rodriguez, no fundamental rights were at issue.
In Dandridge, instead of characterizing the issue in terms of a fundamen-
tal right, the Court defined the subject matter as an “area of economics
and social welfare.”168  The Court has traditionally deferred to the legis-
lative branch in the area of economics.169  Similarly, in Rodriguez, the
Court explicitly stated that the “right” at issue (education) was not a fun-
damental right.170  But, as shown above, that is not the case with jury
service.  Jury service is on par with voting as a fundamental right.  Thus,
163 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
164 Dean, 412 U.S. at 544.
165 Id. (quoting Day-Bright Lighting, 342 U.S. at 424).
166 Id. at 545.
167 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
168 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
170 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
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if we take the analysis from Thiel plus the equal protection application
from Harper, we see that the Court should view the wealth discrimina-
tion stemming from de minimis juror pay as unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
VII. CHALLENGES TO AN EQUAL PROTECTION APPROACH
This Note attempts to provide a legal basis for an attack on a state’s
de minimis juror pay via the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  This argument, however, is not unassailable.  The Supreme
Court has never explicitly held that there is a fundamental right to serve
on a jury.  Lower courts that have addressed the question have split in
their decisions.171  But it is an avenue of attack that has not been ade-
quately advanced.  Indeed, the Second Circuit in United States v. Jack-
man172 raised, sua sponte, an equal protection argument in an opinion
regarding a jury selection case, stating, “the right to serve on juries at all
is a fundamental right akin to the right to vote.”173  In the same breath,
however, the court couched its language, stating that the defendant had
not raised that argument and thus the court did not mean to imply that the
court would recognize the right to serve on the jury as a fundamental
right if the defendant had raised it.174
Even if a court finds that the opportunity to serve on a jury is a
fundamental political right, there are still challenges.  Differences exist,
for example, between jurors self-selecting out of jury selection because
they do not think they can afford it and a state affirmatively forcing a
citizen to pay in order to exercise their fundamental right (such as when a
state mandates a poll tax in order to vote).  Indeed, even in counties that
only compensate jurors with de minimis amounts, jurors are still being
paid for their services—and they are certainly not being forced to pay to
be able to serve on a jury.
Thus, a couple of developments in the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence would strengthen the case that indigent persons are being deprived
of a constitutional right because of de minimis juror pay.  First, the Court
should recognize that there is a fundamental right to serve on a jury.  As
discussed earlier, there is strong support for this idea in Founding-era
171 Compare Adams v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 375, 380 (Cal. 1974) (“[A]n individual’s
interest in serving on a jury cannot be held a fundamental right.”), with United States v. Mc-
Cane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“After all, felons
lose out on fundamental rights such as voting and serving on juries . . . .”), and Bradley v.
Judges of the Superior Court, 372 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (“It is well established that
action by a state in arbitrarily depriving a person of the opportunity to serve on a jury is a
violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution . . . .”).
172 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995).
173 Id. at 1255.
174 Id.
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sources.  Second, the Supreme Court should revisit its holdings on
wealth discrimination and explicitly distinguish cases where there is a
wealth discrimination challenge based on fundamental rights (such as in
Harper) from those that do not contain such a challenge (such as in Rod-
riguez).  These clarifications would pave a clear road for an indigent to
challenge a state or county decision to provide only de minimis pay for
serving on a jury.
CONCLUSION
The ability to serve on a jury is a fundamental political right on par
with voting.  This can be seen through the Founders’ statements and ac-
tions when they defined our nation.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has, on several occasions, suggested that jury service is a right.  And
indeed, the Court has explicitly equated the importance of jury service
with the importance of the right to vote.  Merely because the Court has
not yet recognized such a right does not mean that the Court will not in
the future.  A review of the Court’s jurisprudence in the areas of race,
gender, and jury service demonstrates that the Court is nothing if not
sluggish in protecting the right to serve on a jury.  The Supreme Court in
Thiel recognized that states cannot discriminate against potential jurors
for economic reasons.  The Court failed, however, to ground its holding
on a specific constitutional provision.  This has allowed states to circum-
vent the narrow holding of Thiel and continue to offer jurors only de
minimis pay.  Previous attacks on de minimis juror pay, such as via stat-
utes or other constitutional provisions, have failed.  However, imputing
the logic of the Supreme Court’s holding in Harper regarding voting and
wealth discrimination, it becomes apparent that a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection argument should eliminate state programs that offer
only de minimis jury pay and thereby prevent the indigent class from
exercising its right to serve on a jury.
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